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A B S T R A C T
Public acceptance of energy technologies is an important area of energy and social science research. However,
few studies utilise large datasets which include spatial and temporal dimensions, as well as the demographic and
attitudinal characteristics of survey respondents. In this paper, we analyse twenty-ﬁve waves of the UK
Government's Energy and Climate Change Public Attitudes Tracker: a large, nationally representative dataset
spanning six years (2012 - 2018). This enables unique insights into trends in public acceptance across time, space
and social groups, covering eight energy sources. We ﬁnd diﬀering proﬁles in terms of who supports which types
of energy, with a key division between support for renewable technologies on the one hand, and nuclear and
fracking on the other. We also identify a growing gap between public and policymakers’ attitudes to energy
technologies which we argue must be bridged to ensure a smooth rapid transition that is acceptable to all.
1. Introduction
Given the widespread risks presented by climate change [1], there is
an imperative to transition from fossil fuels to low carbon energy
sources. It is recognised that public acceptance is important for the
eﬀective implementation of energy policies and technologies [2,3], and,
conversely, a lack of public acceptance can act as a barrier to their
uptake [4,5]. Public acceptance of energy sources, and how this can be
explained, has thus become a prominent topic for energy social scien-
tists in recent years [6,7].
Against this backdrop, several research organisations and govern-
ment bodies have started to measure public attitudes towards energy
sources. Examples include the Eurobarometer (in the European Union);
the Afrobarometer (a pan-African series of attitudinal surveys); and the
UK Government’s Energy and Climate Change Public Attitudes Tracker
(PAT). The PAT was established in 2012 to ‘understand and monitor’
public attitudes towards energy and climate change (BEIS, [78]). Sur-
veys such as these provide rich datasets for exploring the underlying
patterns behind support and opposition to energy sources across so-
cieties. However, there has been limited use of such datasets in energy
and social science research to date.
Early studies of public acceptance of energy sources and technolo-
gies used broad quantitative approaches such as opinion polls, cap-
turing a ‘snap-shot’ of general trends and concerns at national or sub-
national scales [8]. More recently, there has been a shift to case-study
based research methods to gain deeper insights into rationales behind
public responses to energy sources and speciﬁc projects (e.g. [9–12]).
These studies indicate that a variety of factors shape public acceptance
of energy sources and projects at local scales, including visual impacts,
economic beneﬁts, demographic characteristics, and environmental
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attitudes.
However, the localised geographic scales of such case-based studies
limits wider understanding of broader national trends, and subsequent
relevance to national policy. Thus, as countries progress further into
their implementation of low carbon transition plans, it becomes valu-
able to utilise the large-scale datasets that have been gathered over
time, and to apply more advanced quantitative techniques to identify
what shapes public support for energy sources at a national scale. This
type of analysis is valuable to researchers and policymakers alike who
are interested in energy policy and technology implementation across
time, space and social groups.
In this paper, we develop and test ﬁve hypotheses to understand
which variables explain public support for a range of energy sources at
the national level. Our hypotheses are informed by the conceptual
framework proposed by Roddis et al. [13], in which they identify eight
categories relating to community acceptance of renewable energy
projects: aesthetic, geographical, temporal, demographic, political,
economic, environmental, and project details. We apply this framework
to consider ‘socio-political acceptance’ i.e. support for energy sources or
policies at a general level, typically gauged by large-scale surveys [14].
Community acceptance, on the other hand, refers to the ‘speciﬁc ac-
ceptance of siting decisions and renewable energy projects by local
stakeholders’ ([14], p. 2685). We therefore exclude the ‘project details’
category as it describes variables relating to the acceptance of in-
dividual energy projects, rather than support for energy sources at the
socio-political level i.e. general attitudes.
Whilst some existing studies do explore factors shaping socio-poli-
tical acceptance of energy sources (e.g. [15,16]), there are a lack of
studies investigating this topic using large-scale datasets that include
spatial and temporal dimensions, as well as the demographic and atti-
tudinal characteristics of respondents. This paper contributes to this
research gap by analysing twenty-ﬁve ‘waves’ (i.e. quarterly surveys) of
the UK PAT: a large, nationally representative dataset spanning from
July 2012 to April 2018 (n=52,525). Data on the location of re-
spondents were made available to the authors at the regional level,
enabling unique geographical insights into this dataset. We cover eight
energy sources: renewable energy (in general), onshore wind, biomass,
oﬀshore wind, wave/tidal, solar, nuclear, and fracking. Given that
much of the existing public acceptance literature focuses on wind en-
ergy [7,17], our study thus contributes timely evidence from across the
energy technology spectrum.
1.1. Research hypotheses
A key debate in the literature on public acceptance of energy
sources is on the eﬀect of familiarity on people’s attitudes. It has tra-
ditionally been assumed, particularly outside of academic debates, that
opposition can be explained by NIMBYism (Not In My Back Yard-ism)
[18]. This assumes that although people may support an energy source
in principle (socio-political acceptance), they are opposed to hosting
projects in their local area (community acceptance). However, the
concept of NIMBYism has been widely critiqued (e.g. [19]) and there is
limited empirical evidence to support it. Whilst some studies ﬁnd
substantiating evidence for NIMBY attitudes (e.g. [20]), many studies
ﬁnd that living close to energy projects, and thus having increased fa-
miliarity with that energy source, actually increases general support
(e.g. [10,21,22]). This has been dubbed the ‘inverse NIMBY’ syndrome
by energy social science researchers [22].
We are interested in whether increased familiarity with energy
technologies and sources is linked to public attitudes, and what this
means for NIMBY or inverse NIMBY theories. Our ﬁrst hypothesis is
therefore that support for energy sources is associated with people’s
familiarity with that technology, estimated through visual exposure,
geographical location of the respondent (urban/rural), and exposure
over time. This falls into the aesthetic, geographical and temporal ca-
tegories of the Roddis et al. [13] framework, given that familiarity is
primarily a function of visual exposure, which is in turn inﬂuenced by
spatial location of the respondent and the relevant energy infra-
structure, as well as exposure over time.
Our second hypothesis relates to the eﬀect of demographic char-
acteristics on support for energy sources, belonging to the demographic
category of the Roddis et al. [13] framework. Several studies have
found sociodemographic characteristics such as age, gender and social
class to be important predictors of attitudes to energy sources. In gen-
eral, research suggests that younger people and women are more likely
to support renewable energy [23–26], whilst older people and men are
more likely to support nuclear and fracking [11,27,28]. However, there
is some disagreement in the literature in terms of gender eﬀects [15].
Higher social classes have been found to be associated with greater
support for renewable energy, nuclear and hydrocarbons [8,11,28]. We
will use the PAT dataset to test the hypothesis that sociodemographic
characteristics can predict socio-political acceptance of energy sources,
and explore to what extent this matters over other variables.
A number of studies highlight the role of political values in ac-
counting for public acceptance of renewable energy sources (e.g.
[29–31]). However, there is relatively little empirical evidence for this.
A key exception is Bidwell [32], who ﬁnds that support for wind energy
is strongly linked to traditional values as opposed to altruistic values.
He therefore suggests that opposition to wind energy is ‘fueled by
conservativism’ (p. 197), rather than by local concerns as suggested by
NIMBY theories. Klick and Smith [33], on the other hand, ﬁnd no
correlation between political party aﬃliation and support for wind
energy. Other studies ﬁnd that conservative political ideology is asso-
ciated with greater support for nuclear power and hydrocarbons (e.g.
[21,34]). Our third hypothesis is therefore on the eﬀect of political
orientation on support for energy sources, which falls into the political
category of the Roddis et al. [13] framework. We predict that people
living in more politically conservative regions (i.e. regions with greater
numbers of parliamentary constituencies represented by the UK’s
Conservative Party) are less likely to support renewable energy sources,
and more likely to support nuclear and fracking.
A relatively under-studied aspect of public acceptance is the eﬀect
of employment in the energy sector on support for energy sources,
belonging to the economic category of the Roddis et al. [13] frame-
work. If there is high employment in a particular energy sector within a
geographical region (e.g. oﬀshore oil and gas in North East Scotland),
we might reasonably assume that people who live in that region are
more likely to support that type of energy source due to the increased
likelihood of aﬃliation(s) to that energy sector, such as direct em-
ployment or employment of a family member or friend. Jones et al. [35]
include this as a variable when investigating onshore wind in Northern
England, but do not ﬁnd it to be a signiﬁcant predictor of support.
However, qualitative research on wind, solar and biodiesel in Spain
ﬁnds that local employment opportunities enhanced public support for
these energy sources in some circumstances [36]. Our fourth hypothesis
is therefore that support for energy sources is positively associated with
regional employment in the related energy sector.
Finally, given the signiﬁcant role of energy generation in con-
tributing to greenhouse gas emissions, we intuitively expect concern
about climate change to contribute to socio-political acceptance of
energy sources. Our ﬁfth hypothesis therefore relates to beliefs about
climate change on support for energy sources, falling into the en-
vironmental category of the Roddis et al. [13] framework. Given their
diﬀering carbon emission proﬁles, we predict that people with higher
concern for climate change are more likely to support renewable energy
sources and less likely to support fracking (i.e. hydraulic fracturing to
extract shale gas, a type of fossil fuel). In terms of nuclear power, in line
with other studies (e.g. [37,38]) we predict that people with higher
climate concern are less likely to support nuclear, despite it having
lower carbon emissions than fossil fuels, due to wider environmental
and ethical concerns such as radioactive waste disposal.
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2. Materials and methods
2.1. The PAT dataset
The PAT is a quarterly survey of UK residents (aged 16+) estab-
lished by the UK Government in 2012. Topics covered include energy
bills, energy security, energy technologies, and energy saving.1 Each
‘wave’ of the survey contains approximately 2100 observations. Data is
collected using face-to-face in-home interviews, conducted by computer
assisted personal interviewing. A central set of questions is asked an-
nually and a subset of questions is asked quarterly where attitudes are
subject to greater variability e.g. if they may vary between seasons
[39]. The survey uses a random sampling quota method, in which re-
spondents are drawn from a small set of homogenous streets in sample
areas. Sample areas are selected by their similar population sizes
identiﬁed through UK census small area statistics, and sampling points
must be contained within a single UK region.2 Quotas are set in terms of
characteristics known to inﬂuence the likelihood of being at home in
order to minimise sampling bias [39]. Diﬀerent sampling points are
used for each wave of the survey i.e. the same participants are not re-
turned to in each wave, as they would be if the data collection was
following a longitudinal design.
PAT data are available on the website of the UK Department of
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS). Our analysis includes
all waves up to and including Wave 25, spanning the period July 2012
to April 2018. Sociodemographic data is collected for all survey re-
spondents, including age group, gender, working status, tenure, social
grade, household income, and area type (urban/rural). The region
where the respondents were sampled from was obtained by permission
of BEIS under the UK Oﬃce for National Statistics (ONS) Approved
Researcher Scheme. Whilst this allows for spatial analysis of the data, it
should be noted that UK regions are relatively large geographical areas
meaning the granularity of the spatial analysis is quite low. Despite this
limitation, the dataset is one of the most extensive of its kind containing
geographical data, meaning it is uniquely placed to oﬀer spatial insights
into support for energy sources, as well as how other variables are as-
sociated with support.
The PAT measures attitudes to energy sources on a ﬁve-point scale,
ranging from ‘Strongly support’ to ‘Strongly oppose’. It also allows a
‘Don’t know’ response. To avoid small sample sizes, which could po-
tentially compromise the conﬁdentiality of respondents, we collapsed
these categories into three levels: Support (including ‘Support’ and
‘Strongly support’), Neutral (including ‘Neither support or oppose’), and
Oppose (including ‘Oppose’ and ‘Strongly oppose’). Reducing the re-
sponses from a ﬁve-point to a three-point scale, whilst necessary to
avoid breaching stringent conﬁdentiality rules of the ONS, meant that
some nuance was lost in terms of predicting the likelihood of strong
feelings of support or opposition. Reducing categories was also neces-
sary to create a ‘balanced’ dataset (Section 2.2).
PAT respondents who answered ‘Don’t know’ were excluded from
the analysis of that energy source as this does not provide relevant
insights for our hypotheses. Respondents from Northern Ireland were
also excluded from our analysis as low sample sizes from this region
could again compromise conﬁdentiality. The extent of the analysis is
therefore Great Britain (i.e. England, Scotland, and Wales). Not all
waves of the PAT survey asked the questions relevant to our analysis,
meaning our sample size varies between the energy sources (Table 1
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1 The content of the PAT was changed in August 2018 to reﬂect the expanded
remit of BEIS (Wave 26 onwards).
2 There are 12 UK regions (formerly known as Government Oﬃce Regions in
England): North East, North West, Yorkshire and Humber, East Midlands, West
Midlands, Eastern England, London, South East, South West, Wales, Scotland
and Northern Ireland. The latter three are not Government Oﬃce Regions, but
are used as equivalents.
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shows sample sizes for each energy source and original wording of the
questions in the PAT questionnaire).
2.2. Data analysis
Our analytical approach falls into the ‘data analysis and statistics’
category of research method for energy social science, as classiﬁed by
Sovacool et al. [40]. To begin, we mapped the spatial variation in
support for energy sources across Great Britain in order to visualise the
PAT dataset. To do this, we calculated the mean percentage of support
for each of the eight energy sources in our study between April 2012
and July 2018 for the whole of Great Britain. We then calculated the
average diﬀerence from this mean in each of the geographical regions
of the study area. To display this information, we created eight chor-
opleth maps sharing the same colour ramp so that the diﬀerence be-
tween overall levels of support for energy sources was immediately
clear (Fig. 2). We then labelled each region with the diﬀerence from the
mean of Great Britain to show whether support in that region was
higher or lower than the average, and to show the variance between
regions.
We ran Mann-Kendall (MK) tests on annual time series of support
between 2012 and 2018 (i.e. the percentage of PAT respondents an-
swering support or strongly support for the energy source in each year)
to identify whether there was a statistically signiﬁcant monotonic
trend, either increasing or decreasing. We chose to use MK tests as they
are non-parametric, which is appropriate due to the limited number of
data points when the data was disaggregated by year, meaning that
normal distribution of the data cannot be conﬁdently determined [41].
We added a time series plot to each of the choropleth maps to show how
support for each energy source changed over the study period, and
whether the trend was statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The
spatial and time series analysis (as well as the regression analysis de-
scribed below) was carried out using weighted data, applying the
weighting provided by BEIS which is designed to make the data re-
presentative of the entire UK adult population [39].
To directly address our research hypotheses (Section 1.1), we used
ordinal logistic regression (henceforth referred to as ordinal regres-
sion). Ordinal regression is a type of statistical analysis which assesses
the relationship between an ordinal dependent variable, such as a Likert
scale, and one or more independent variables. The type of ordinal re-
gression used in this analysis is a generalised ordered logit model with
partial proportional odds. Unlike the more common proportional odds
model, this type of model does not assume that the eﬀect (i.e. slope
coeﬃcient) of each independent variable is the same across all cate-
gories of the dependent variable [42]. Instead, it tests the assumption of
proportionality for each independent variable: for those which meet the
assumption, a single slope coeﬃcient is estimated; for those which do
not, separate slope coeﬃcients are estimated for each cumulative di-
chotomous categorisation of the response variable. We chose this type
of model as diagnostic tests (following [43,44]) showed that the as-
sumption of proportional odds was not met by our data in many cases.
The models were run in Stata 14 using the user-written program go-
logit2 [45].
A regression model was calculated for each of the eight energy
sources in the study: renewable energy (in general), onshore wind,
biomass, oﬀshore wind, wave/tidal, solar, nuclear, and fracking. The
dependent variable was the PAT respondent’s aggregated level of sup-
port for the energy source in question (either support, neutral or op-
pose). The independent variables were selected based on the hy-
potheses being tested (Table 2). The data for the independent variables
were either obtained directly from the PAT itself, or calculated from
external data sources (Supporting information contains full details).
Social grade (a measure based on occupation, collected in the PAT) was
used as a proxy for social class. Category A was treated as the highest
social grade (referring to higher managerial, administrative or profes-
sional workers) and category E as the lowest social grade (referring to
unemployed people, state pensioners and casual workers). All variables
were matched to the appropriate survey year as far as data availability
allowed. For example, to calculate parliamentary constituencies re-
presented by the UK’s Conservative Party, percentages were assigned to
each region based on the most recent general election data (either
2010, 2015 or 2017). Multicollinearity between independent variables
was measured using variance inﬂation factors (VIF); following Kock and
Lynn [46] the VIF values deemed acceptable were those less than 3.3.
Initial analysis of the dataset showed that, for several energy
sources, the levels of support are strongly skewed (Fig. 1). The dataset
can therefore be described as ‘imbalanced’ i.e. the frequency of ob-
servations in each response category are not comparable. Imbalanced
datasets can cause problems in statistical analyses such as ordinal re-
gression as their underlying algorithms expect balanced class distribu-
tions [47]. For this reason, an informed under-sampling approach was
taken to subsetting the data. This has been shown to reduce the pro-
blems associated with imbalanced data in a variety of studies (e.g.
[48–51]). Speciﬁcally, we generated ﬁve random subsets for each en-
ergy source, based on the size of the minority class i.e. classes within
each subset were created to be approximately the same size as the
smallest class [52]. By taking this approach (bootstrap aggregating or
‘bagging’), we could train the models on a large number of samples
whilst removing as the problem of class imbalance. The results of the
models estimated for each of the random subsets were then combining
by taking the average (mean) across the ﬁve models. This technique has
been shown to provide substantial gains in model accuracy and helps to
reduce variance error [53]. The generalised ordered logit model with
partial proportional odds can be written as below, where M is the
number of categories of the ordinal variable:
> =
⍺ +
+ ⍺ +
= … −P Y j
X β
X β
j( )
exp( )
1 [exp( )]
, 1, 2, , M 1i
j i j
j i j (1)
Eq. (1) Generalised ordered logit model with partial proportional odds
The outputs of ordinal regression models are odds ratios (ORs). For
continuous variables, ORs greater than one indicate that the odds of a
higher score of the dependent variable increase by this amount per one
unit change; ORs less than one indicate decreased odds of a higher score
per one unit change. For categorical variables, each category is com-
pared to a reference or ‘baseline’ category (Table 2). The dependent
variable was coded so that higher scores relate to increased support for
an energy source (oppose=1, neutral= 2, support= 3). Because of
how generalised ordered logit models with partial proportional odds
are calculated, ORs are generated for each cumulative dichotomous
categorisation of the dependent variable (similar to a series of binary
logit models). Therefore, the ORs generated by our regression models
refer to the odds of being in the support category (vs neutral/oppose),
and the neutral/support categories (vs oppose) i.e. the odds of getting a
‘higher’ score on the dependent variable scale.
3. Results
Our results show that the energy source with the highest level of
support in Great Britain between July 2012 and April 2018 was solar,
with a mean score of 80.1%. This was followed by renewable energy (in
general) which scored 76.8%, wave and tidal (74%), oﬀshore wind
(73.6%), onshore wind (66.7%) and biomass (62.5%). Nuclear and
fracking had notably lower levels of support, with mean scores of 37.1%
and 22.1% respectively. Support for all renewable energy sources is
increasing over time (Fig. 2). These trends were statistically signiﬁcant
in the case of onshore wind, biomass, oﬀshore wind, and wave/tidal
energy (p < 0.05). Support for nuclear and fracking, on the other
hand, was found to be decreasing over time. The trend in relation to
nuclear was statistically signiﬁcant (p < 0.05); the trend for fracking
was very slightly short of statistical signiﬁcance (p=0.08), perhaps
due to the fewer data points for this technology given that the PAT only
P. Roddis, et al. Energy Research & Social Science 56 (2019) 101226
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began tracking its support in 2014, whilst the other energy sources
began in 2012.
In terms of geographical variation, our results show an approximate
North-South divide whereby more southerly regions of Great Britain
(other than London) tend to have higher average support for energy
sources than more northerly regions (Fig. 2). Most notably, the South
West and Eastern England have consistently above average support for
most types of energy, whilst Scotland and London show consistently
lower levels of support for all energy sources than other regions (Fig. 2).
This perhaps indicates that the familiarity eﬀect follows a non-linear
trend, given that London has the lowest rates of installed capacity for
many energy technologies due to its high population density, whereas
Scotland has consistently high rates of installed capacity (Table S4 in
Supporting information). In other words, people least familiar and most
familiar with energy technologies appear to have the lowest levels of
support. Wales has notably low support for onshore wind, and the
second highest level of installed capacity (after Scotland), supporting
the idea of very high levels of exposure reducing support, perhaps due
to perceptions of distributional injustice.
If urban and rural respondents are mapped separately (Fig. S2 in
Supporting information), similar patterns to those described above
continue to pertain. Support for renewable energy (in general), bio-
mass, wave/tidal and solar was found to be higher in rural areas, whilst
support for nuclear, fracking and wind energy (both onshore and oﬀ-
shore) was found to be higher in urban areas. A notable outlier is that
rural respondents in North West England have much higher average
levels of support for nuclear than their urban counterparts. This is po-
tentially due to the elevated levels of rural employment in the nuclear
sector in this part of Great Britain, which hosted the world’s ﬁrst in-
dustrial-scale nuclear power facility (Calder Hall, opened in 1956) and
continues to host several nuclear power stations and the Sellaﬁeld nu-
clear reprocessing facility [54].
As shown, mapping public attitudes to energy sources by region and
area type can provide some insights into how attitudes vary geo-
graphically, and potential reasons why. In general, however, we found
that the age group of the PAT respondent and their level of concern for
climate change were stronger and more consistent predictors of support
for energy sources than spatial variables (Fig. 3). Our regression results
indicate a divide between younger people, women and those with
higher climate concern (who are more likely to support renewable
energy sources) and older people, men, and those with lower climate
concern (who are more likely to support nuclear and fracking). The
other independent variables used to test our hypotheses, particularly
political and economic variables, had a less apparent and consistent
eﬀect on PAT respondents’ likelihood of support for energy sources.
The regression models were best able to explain support for oﬀshore
wind, accounting for 19% of the variance (Nagelkerke R2). This was
followed by solar (18%), onshore wind (17%) and renewable energy
(17%). The models were weakest for wave and tidal energy (13%),
fracking (13%), and nuclear (11%). All models were statistically sig-
niﬁcant (p < 0.001). Thus, although the independent variables in-
cluded in our modelling clearly do have some explanatory power, a key
ﬁnding of this paper is that they do not fully explain people’s attitudes
to energy sources (at least when these variables are calculated at the
regional level). This is an important limitation to our analysis, and
suggests that regional-scale analysis is too coarse a resolution to fully
explain people’s attitudes. Alternatively, the lack of variance explained
by our models could indicate that there are other factors inﬂuencing
people’s attitudes to energy sources which we have not modelled, or
Table 2
Variables included in the ordinal regression models to predict support for eight energy sources: renewable energy (in general), onshore wind, biomass, oﬀshore wind,
wave/tidal, solar, nuclear, and fracking.
Hypothesis Category of the conceptual
framework
Independent variable Data source for the variable
Familiarity eﬀect (exposure to
energy sources)
Aesthetic Percentage of region where energy technology is
visible (estimated using viewshed analysis
techniques)
UK Renewable Energy Planning Database (REPD),
Digest of UK Energy Statistics (DUKES), UK Oil and Gas
Authority (OGA)a
Geographical Area type (urban area was compared to rural area) UK Energy and Climate Change Public Attitudes Tracker
(UK PAT)b
Temporal Year of the PAT survey UK PAT
Eﬀect of demographic
characteristics
Demographic Age group (ages 16–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54, and
55–64 were compared to age 65+)
UK PAT
Gender (male was compared to female) UK PAT
Social Grade (A, B, C1, C2, and D were compared
to E)
UK PAT
Eﬀect of political orientation Political % parliamentary constituencies in region
represented by the UK Conservative Party
UK Electoral Commission
Eﬀect of employment in energy
sector
Economic % jobs in the related energy sector in region (of
total regional employment)c
Renewable Energy Association (REA), Nuclear Industry
Association (NIA), Oil and Gas UK (OGUK)
Eﬀect of climate change concern Environmental Level of concern (‘very’, ‘fairly’, and ‘not very’
were compared to ‘not at all’)
UK PAT
For renewable energy sources, the whole renewable energy sector was used as the ‘related energy sector’ rather than disaggregating employment to the speciﬁc
renewable technology sectors e.g. wind, solar, biomass.
a April 2018 monthly extract of the REPD; DUKES 2017; OGA Onshore Wells (OGA Open Data, 30/05/2018).
b Waves 1–25 (July 2012–April 2018). Includes survey questions 3, 13a, 13b, 13c, 13d, 13e, 14a, and 15b.
c Employment ﬁgures refer to direct employment (as estimated by REA, NIA and OGUK industry reports). Total regional employment obtained from UK Labour
Force Survey (A07: Regional Labour Market Summary).
Fig. 1. Levels of support for energy sources in Waves 1–25 of the UK
Government’s Energy and Climate Change Public Attitudes Tracker (July
2012–April 2018). All statistical results remain Crown Copyright.
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Fig. 2. Support for energy sources in regions of Great Britain (2012–2018). Shetland Islands have the same results as the rest of Scotland. Labels show the diﬀerence
from the mean level of support. Solid lines indicate time series has a statistically signiﬁcant monotonic trend (p < 0.05). Data is from the UK Government’s Energy
and Climate Change Public Attitudes Tracker (Waves 1–25). All statistical results remain Crown Copyright.
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that there is random heterogeneity in the sample i.e. random individual
diﬀerences in opinion.
Fig. 3 shows the ORs for the independent variables included in each
of the eight regression models. The ﬁrst set of ORs (indicated by blue
circles) refers to the odds of belonging to the support category, com-
pared to the neutral/oppose categories (S vs N/O). The second set of
ORs (indicated by orange circles) refers to the odds of belonging to the
support/neutral categories, compared to the oppose category (S/N vs
O). Where the OR is the same in both sets, the independent variable
meets the proportional odds assumption; where it diﬀers, it does not
meet this assumption. As an example, the regression model for onshore
wind estimated two ORs for the ‘energy jobs’ variable. The blue circle is
above 1 and solid, showing a statistically signiﬁcant (p < 0.05) posi-
tive eﬀect for higher employment increasing the odds of being in the
support category for onshore wind. The orange circle is below 1 and
hollow, indicating a statistically insigniﬁcant (p < 0.05) negative eﬀect
for higher employment increasing the odds of being in the support and/
or neutral categories. In other words, having more renewable energy
jobs in the region increases the likelihood of support towards onshore
wind, but not necessarily of neutrality.
Fig. 3. Scatter plots showing odds ratios (ORs) for variables used to predict support for energy sources. Blue circles show ORs for the support category compared to
neutral/oppose categories. Orange circles show ORs for support/neutral categories compared to the oppose category. Where there is one circle, the same OR applies
to both outcomes. Solid circles indicate statistically signiﬁcant ORs (p < 0.05). ORs greater than 1 indicate positive eﬀects; ORs less than 1 indicate negative eﬀects.
All statistical results remain Crown Copyright.
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4. Discussion
4.1. The familiarity eﬀect
We tested the eﬀect of familiarity on people’s support for energy
sources using three independent variables: visual exposure, urban or
rural dwelling, and the year in which the PAT respondent was surveyed.
Our results show limited support for the familiarity eﬀect via visual
exposure. We predicted that increased visual exposure would have a
positive eﬀect on the likelihood of support as people would become
accustomed to energy infrastructure being part of the visual landscape.
Several studies have found aesthetic concerns to be prominent in ex-
plaining public acceptance of energy sources, particularly wind energy
(e.g. [19,23,31,55]), indicating the importance of visual impacts in
informing attitudes. However, our results do not show that visual ex-
posure had a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on people’s likelihood of
support for energy sources in either a positive or negative way.
The exception to our ﬁndings on visual exposure was in relation to
wave and tidal energy. These energy sources are referred to collectively
throughout this paper given that the PAT questionnaire collects atti-
tudes to both together, meaning attitudes between them cannot be
disaggregated. Our results showed there to be a statistically signiﬁcant
negative eﬀect of visual exposure on support for these sources of energy.
However, this result should be interpreted with caution given that there
is currently very limited deployment of wave and tidal energy in Great
Britain (23MW in South West England and 11MW in Scotland, re-
sulting in percentage exposure of 0.04% and 0.07% in these regions
respectively). Additionally, these types of energy technology are often
submerged underwater meaning they are sometimes not visible from
land. We estimated an average height of 2m to account for the like-
lihood of some infrastructure (e.g. cabling, ﬂoats, buoys) being visible
above the waterline. It should be noted that there are no tidal range
projects in Great Britain, such as dams or barrages spanning bays or
estuaries, only tidal stream technologies such as underwater turbines
[56].
The lack of signiﬁcant eﬀects regarding visual exposure could be
explained by the low spatial resolution of those data. This analysis
could be improved by using more ﬁnely grained georeferenced data on
respondents’ locations and mobility patterns. This would allow a better
understanding of their exposure to energy infrastructure, however, such
data are not currently available. Using total regional installed capacity
as a predictor variable instead of visual exposure in the regression
models was also not statistically signiﬁcant. This analysis could further
be improved upon by using more detailed height data (or MW/area) for
energy installations, accounting for the trend towards larger infra-
structure after 2012, to more accurately model landscape impacts.
However, it could be that visual exposure to an energy source does not
by itself alter people’s attitudes; rather it could be the way in which
energy installations change people’s perceptions of landscapes and their
attachment to places [57], which is very diﬃcult to model at a national
level.
Our results show that people living in urban areas were more likely
than rural people to support wind energy (both onshore and oﬀshore),
nuclear, and fracking. A key exception is in relation to nuclear in the
North West of England, which showed higher support in rural areas
than urban areas, potentially due to employment eﬀects (Section 3). We
found that people in rural areas were more likely than urban people to
support renewable energy (in general), biomass, wave/tidal, and solar.
The only statistically signiﬁcant results in our analysis, however, were
in relation to onshore wind and fracking, which showed that contrary to
our hypothesis on the familiarity eﬀect, people in rural areas were less
likely to support or be neutral towards these technologies. Given that
these are both more suited to rural than urban areas, this suggests that
people living closer to the impacts (or potential impacts) of onshore
wind and fracking installations are less likely to support these tech-
nologies.
These ﬁndings somewhat contrast with other studies on this topic,
particularly in relation to fracking. Other studies have identiﬁed
stronger support in places closer to fracking sites. For example,
Whitmarsh et al. [11] ﬁnd that out of three areas surveyed in the UK,
the area in which fracking was already underway showed signiﬁcantly
more support than areas where it is not viable. Similarly, Boudet et al.
[58] ﬁnd that people in the US who live in closer proximity to fracking
sites show greater support for the practice. The key diﬀerence between
these studies and ours is that fracking has not taken place at a national
scale in Great Britain, meaning that socio-political attitudes are in-
formed by hypothetical scenarios rather than direct experience. This
could explain why our results do not show the same proximity eﬀect as
other studies do, or this may be because the resolution of analysis is
coarser than other studies’. Alternatively, our ﬁndings may indicate that
people in Great Britain are de facto opposed to fracking, whether they
have direct experience or not, as shown by the low average level of
support for this technology (mean= 22%).
Our ﬁndings around temporal familiarity reveal a division between
renewable energy sources with nuclear and fracking. For renewable
energy (in general), onshore wind, and oﬀshore wind, each year that
passed between 2012 and 2018 increased people’s likelihood of support
or being neutral in a statistically signiﬁcant way at the 5% level. For
nuclear and fracking, however, each year that passed decreased the
likelihood of people supporting or being neutral towards these tech-
nologies (this was statistically signiﬁcant for nuclear at the 5% level
and fracking at the 10% level). In other words, the likelihood of op-
position to nuclear and fracking increased over this period, whilst it
decreased for renewable energy and wind energy. This could suggest
that people have become more familiar with renewables over time, in
line with our hypothesis regarding the familiarity eﬀect. For nuclear,
there has not been any signiﬁcant changes in the level of deployment
over this time, meaning that its popularity has decreased despite the
same levels of public exposure. Fracking has commenced in Great
Britain over this period, though at relatively slow pace, meaning that
opposition has increased despite similar levels of public exposure.
Another explanation for the increase in support for renewable en-
ergy sources between 2012 and 2018, and the decrease for fracking, is
that concern for climate change has also increased over this time period
(Fig. S3 in Supporting information). For nuclear, it could be that the
escalating costs of constructing new nuclear power stations such as
Hinkley Point C are aﬀecting people’s attitudes in a negative way,
particularly when the costs of many renewable technologies are falling
[59]. There has been signiﬁcant public debate in the UK about the ﬁ-
nancial cost of transitioning to low carbon energy, meaning that eco-
nomic criteria may well be prominent in people’s minds when asked
about their support for energy sources. Another key socio-political issue
which may have aﬀected public attitudes over this period is the adop-
tion of the UN Paris Agreement, which was agreed in 2015 (with much
publicity) and ratiﬁed in 2016. This is likely to have raised awareness of
climate change and the urgency of mitigation measures, such as shifting
from fossil fuels to low carbon energy sources [60,61].
In summary, we did not ﬁnd evidence for the familiarity eﬀect via
visual exposure, though this could be due to the limitations of model-
ling this variable at a regional scale. We found that onshore wind and
fracking are less popular in rural communities than in cities, but re-
newable energy (in general), solar, wave/tidal and biomass are more
popular. Whilst this could be interpreted as NIMBYism in relation to
onshore wind and fracking, and inverse NIMBYism for the others, it is
diﬃcult to draw ﬁrm conclusions on this given that our research design
does not allow a strong understanding of why people feel the way they
do. Indeed, when the results of our regression modelling are considered
in conjunction with our spatial analysis (Figs. 2 and S2), it suggests that
more subtle considerations may be at play, such as rural employment
eﬀects and concerns around distributional (in)justice. Finally, our re-
sults show support for the familiarity eﬀect via temporal exposure for
renewable energy sources, though this could also be explained by other
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trends between 2012 and 2018 such as increasing concern for climate
change. We do not ﬁnd evidence to support the familiarity eﬀect via
temporal exposure for nuclear and fracking, for which support is de-
clining despite no major changes in deployment rates.
4.2. The eﬀect of demographics
Demographics were found to have a clear eﬀect on people’s like-
lihood of supporting diﬀerent energy sources in a statistically sig-
niﬁcant way (at the 5% level). Younger age groups were more likely to
support renewable energy, onshore wind, biomass, oﬀshore wind,
wave/tidal and solar. This eﬀect was particularly pronounced in the
case of onshore wind and oﬀshore wind, with the odds of someone in
the 16–24 age group supporting these energy sources on average four
times that of someone in the 65+ age group. Older age groups, on the
other hand, were more likely to support nuclear and fracking. For ex-
ample, the odds of someone aged 16–24 being in the support category
for nuclear were approximately 20% less than someone aged 65+. This
indicates a divergence in preferences for energy sources between age
groups.
One explanation for the eﬀect of age on people’s attitudes to energy
sources is the concept of ‘Shifting Baseline Syndrome’ (SBS). SBS was
originally coined to describe the phenomenon of each generation per-
ceiving the state of ecosystems they encountered in their childhood as
normal [62]. It could also describe people’s attitudes towards energy
sources, although it has received limited application in the ﬁeld of
energy social science to date. An exception to this is Ladenburg and
Dubgaard [24] who ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in attitudes towards
oﬀshore wind farms between age groups, with younger people gen-
erally more positive than older people. Following Short [63], they
suggest this may be explained by the diﬀerences in the ‘mental land-
scape’ of diﬀerent generations: ‘older respondents might think of a
“pristine” mental landscape which does not include wind turbines. On
the other hand, the mental landscape of younger respondents might
include wind turbines, because they were already present in the land-
scape from their past (childhood)’ (pp. 4067). Because the younger
generations in the PAT dataset have renewable energy as part of their
‘baseline’, this could explain why they are more likely than older gen-
erations to support it.
Our ﬁndings around gender again reiterate a diﬀerence between
those likely to support renewable energy sources, and those likely to
support nuclear and fracking. While women were more likely to support
all types of renewable energy other than solar, men were more likely to
support nuclear and fracking (these results were statistically signiﬁcant
at the 5% level). These ﬁndings are in line with other studies’ ﬁndings
(e.g. [28,26,10,11]) and could be explained by diﬀering perceptions of
risk. Gender has been found to be an important inﬂuence on risk per-
ception, with women tending to be more risk averse [64]. Given the
various risks associated with fracking and nuclear such as water con-
tamination, earth tremors and nuclear accidents, this may explain why
men were more likely to support these energy sources, and women were
more likely to oppose them.
In terms of social class, our results support other studies which ﬁnd
higher social class to be associated with greater support for nuclear and
hydrocarbons (e.g. [11,28]). This may be because higher levels of
education (which are often correlated with higher social class) increases
people’s awareness of the societal need for energy, or potentially en-
hances the perception that risks can be handled by technical manage-
ment solutions. A similar pattern was identiﬁed for renewable energy
sources, though this eﬀect was quite weak and only statistically sig-
niﬁcant in a few cases (Fig. 3). Social class therefore does not appear to
be a strong determinant of support for renewable energy sources.
In summary, our results show that younger age groups and women
were more likely to support renewables, whilst older age groups and
men were more likely to support nuclear and fracking. These ﬁndings
are broadly in line with other studies, and support our original
hypothesis (Section 1.1); existing studies have somewhat varied ﬁnd-
ings around gender, meaning that our results help to add clarity to this
area. However, our hypothesis was not supported by our results on
social class, other than in relation to nuclear and fracking. These energy
sources were signiﬁcantly more likely to be supported by higher social
grades than lower social grades (which are used in this study as a proxy
for social class). We had predicted that people of higher social classes
would be more likely to support all energy sources in this study.
4.3. Political and economic eﬀects
Our hypothesis on the eﬀect of political orientation was partially
supported and partially contradicted by our ﬁndings. We predicted that
people living in areas with higher levels of representation by the UK
Conservative Party were less likely to support renewable sources, and
more likely to support nuclear and fracking. Our ﬁndings, however,
show that people living in more politically conservative regions were
marginally more likely to support nuclear, onshore wind and renewable
energy (statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level). Our results therefore
support the literature which ﬁnds that conservative political ideology is
associated with greater support for nuclear power (e.g. [34]), but do
not support the literature which ﬁnds that conservatism is associated
with lower support for renewable energy (e.g. [32]). It should be noted
that these conclusions are subject to substantial uncertainty given that
we did not have data on the political orientation of individual PAT
respondents, only regionally aggregated election data. This analysis
could be improved if a more accurate measure of the political or-
ientation of survey respondents were available.
Interestingly, support for all types of energy in the PAT survey was
consistently below average in Scotland and London, and frequently in
Wales and the North East. This could suggest that being politically
isolated from central decision-making bodies (in the case of Scotland
and Wales, which historically have a tense relationship with the central
UK government in London) inﬂuences citizens’ likelihood of supporting
policies and technologies proposed centrally. On the other hand, people
living within London (and therefore theoretically ‘close’ to centralised
institutions) are also below average in terms of support, perhaps be-
cause of a lack of familiarity and exposure. Following Batel and Devine-
Wright [65], we recommend further research into how political beliefs
interact with public support for energy transitions, particularly given
the context of a rise in populism and major political developments such
as Brexit which have implications for energy policy and planning.
Similarly, our results also partially support and partially contradict
our fourth hypothesis: the eﬀect of employment in the related energy
sector on support for energy sources. We expected to ﬁnd greater levels
of support in regions where there is higher employment in the related
industry. In support of this hypothesis, we found that people living in
areas with higher employment in onshore wind were more likely to
support this type of energy source (statistically signiﬁcant at the 5%
level). Our spatial analysis also identiﬁed high support for nuclear in
rural North West England, where there is historically high employment
in this sector (Fig. S2). Contrastingly, we found that high employment
in the oil and gas sector was associated with decreased support for
fracking (statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level), contrary to our pre-
diction that this would boost support. This could suggest that people
who already have oil and gas development in their region do not want
even more in the form of fracking, despite potential employment op-
portunities in the locality.
4.4. The eﬀect of environmental beliefs
Of all the independent variables included in our regression model-
ling, concern for climate change was the strongest and most consistent
predictor of support for diﬀerent energy sources. The odds of people
who were very or fairly concerned being in the support or neutral ca-
tegories for all renewable energy sources were, on average, three times
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that of those who were not at all concerned about climate change. By
contrast, the odds of people who were very concerned about climate
change supporting nuclear power and fracking were approximately half
of those of people who were not at all concerned. These results were
statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. These ﬁndings are in line with
our predictions and other existing studies in this area (e.g.
[37,38,26,11]). Our ﬁfth hypothesis on the eﬀect of environmental
beliefs was therefore strongly supported by our results.
Importantly, concern for climate change is increasing over time,
rising from 63% in 2012 to 71% in 2018 as measured by the PAT (Fig.
S3). Over this period, support for all renewable energy sources has been
increasing, whilst support for nuclear and fracking has been decreasing.
This suggests that as concern for climate change continues to increase,
and particularly as climate impacts such as ﬂoods and heat waves are
felt more frequently and severely in Great Britain [66], the already
substantial gap between public support for renewable and non-renew-
able energy will continue to grow. Interestingly, although nuclear
power is advocated by some stakeholders as a response to climate
change given that it produces fewer carbon emissions than fossil fuels,
this does not result in higher support for nuclear amongst PAT re-
spondents with greater climate concern. This is presumably due to
wider environmental and ethical concerns about nuclear energy, such
as the safe disposal of waste and associated risks to future generations.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have conducted quantitative and spatial analysis of
a large national dataset spanning six years: the UK Government’s
Energy and Climate Change Public Attitudes Tracker (PAT), from July
2012 to April 2018. Informed by the conceptual framework developed
by Roddis et al. [13] to investigate community acceptance of renewable
energy projects, we identiﬁed and collated a range of variables to test
what shapes public support for energy sources at a national scale. By
utilising this dataset, we addressed gaps in the existing literature of how
trends in public support have unfolded across time, space and social
groups, rather than at localised case study scales. Our ﬁndings thus
have broader implications and relevance to national policy and the
national governance of low carbon energy transitions. They also help to
understand and explain socio-political acceptance of eight diﬀerent
energy sources, thereby adding insights to the literature beyond well-
studied technologies.
We ﬁnd that despite commonly held assumptions that public op-
position to energy can be characterised as NIMBYism (Not In My Back
Yard-ism), the relationship between the amount of energy infra-
structure in people’s region, as well as the visual impact of this infra-
structure, had limited eﬀect on people’s support for that energy source.
In other words, we did not ﬁnd a clear link between direct experience of
energy developments in a person’s region (i.e. at the community level)
with their general attitudes towards that type of energy (i.e. at the
socio-political level). Whilst we did identify some spatial variation in
attitudes across Great Britain, suggesting that geography does play a
role to some extent, the strongest predictors of support were demo-
graphic characteristics (particularly age and gender), concern for cli-
mate change, and time. Our research therefore lends support to other
scholars who argue that NIMBYism is not a satisfactory theory for ex-
plaining public acceptance (e.g. Burningham, [77]), as well as research
suggesting that worldviews and values may be the most important
predictors of attitudes [67], something it was not possible for us to
consider using the PAT dataset. Indeed, the relatively low variance
explained by our regression models suggests that there are other im-
portant predictor variables which we did not include. Analysis at a ﬁner
resolution may also help to uncover further and more detailed spatial
patterns.
Whilst this paper has focused on the public or ‘societal’ dimension of
socio-political acceptance, there is also a need for continued research
on the political and policymaking dimension of this topic, and better
integration between these dimensions to understand the broader dy-
namics of social acceptance of energy sources and transitions as a whole
[68,69]. As energy social scientist Maarten Wolsink emphasises, social
acceptance can be thought of as a “bundle of dynamic processes instead
of a set of actor positions” (2018, p. 287), meaning that integrated
approaches are important to provide a full understanding of this com-
plex social phenomenon. Additionally, we cannot be sure that our
ﬁndings can be generalised to countries other than Great Britain,
meaning that similar research designs using comparable national data
would also be valuable for deepening understanding of this topic across
multiple contexts.
Importantly, our analysis shows that support for renewables has
substantially increased from 2012 to 2018, whilst support for nuclear
and fracking has markedly decreased. As concern for climate change
increases (a trend also demonstrated by the PAT), it seems likely that
these diverging levels of support for diﬀerent energy sources will con-
tinue to travel in opposite directions. Given that younger people were
found to be more likely to support renewable energy sources, and older
people were more likely to support non-renewable nuclear and
fracking, it seems likely that in the future the public will increasingly
favour renewable over non-renewable energy sources, at least at the
‘socio-political’ level of acceptance i.e. in terms of generalised public
attitudes, though not necessarily in terms of ‘community acceptance’ of
speciﬁc energy projects. However, it cannot be ruled out that pre-
ferences will change as the current younger generation grows older,
meaning that continued research in this area is important in order to
monitor these trends.
This raises an important issue around the relationship between
public and policymakers’ attitudes to energy sources, with implications
for national governance of low carbon transitions. Whilst the UK
Government is backing a nuclear expansion programme and shale gas
development through fracking, it has repeatedly cut subsidies for on-
shore renewable technologies and changed planning regulations
making it harder to build renewable energy projects [70], citing a lack
of public acceptance as a rationale [71]. This highlights a clear conﬂict
between national policymakers’ preferences for the UK’s energy future,
and the preferences of the public (as measured by the UK Government)
i.e. the two ‘dimensions’ of socio-political acceptance, as theorised by
Wüstenhagen et al. [14]. If the transition to a low carbon future is to be
achieved in a smooth and timely way, and in a way that is acceptable to
all stakeholders, it is crucial that these divergent socio-political pre-
ferences are somehow aligned. Whether this is achieved through
changes to policy and the energy sources that are supported by pol-
icymakers, or by targeted campaigns to change public perceptions,
there is a clear need for dialogue between stakeholders to bridge this
widening gap and to reach consensus on the energy mix that will be
used to achieve decarbonisation.
In this context, it becomes increasingly important to have consistent
and reliable data to measure trends in attitudes across society. It is
critical that there is long-term consistency in the measurement of public
attitudes in order to take account of changes in trends over time, and to
inform long-term policy development. The PAT is an extremely valu-
able resource in this regard, making it concerning that BEIS has recently
reduced the regularity with which it asks some questions, speciﬁcally
the questions measuring attitudes on fracking and nuclear [72].
To conclude, there are multiple rationales for policymakers to
measure public attitudes towards energy issues, including enhancing
the legitimacy of decision-making (instrumental rationale), providing
non-expert input to policy decisions (substantive rationale), and in-
creasing democracy (normative rationale) [73]. However, if public at-
titudes are not seemingly incorporated into decision-making processes,
it becomes unclear which of these rationales is being pursued, poten-
tially eroding trust in decision-making institutions and damaging the
social license of energy industries to operate if they do not have the
backing of the citizenry. Whilst public attitudes are only one of multiple
considerations involved in energy policymaking, our ﬁndings call on
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policymakers to be more transparent in justifying decisions to ensure a
smooth and rapid low carbon transition that is acceptable to all.
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